stickiness. At the same time, however, the No Bias Finding seems to contradict an extensive body of empirical evidence suggesting that default rules may well be sticky beyond the predictions of rational choice models.
In one of only two earlier specific experimental tests of contractual defaults, KOROBKIN [1998] used three contract negotiation scenarios. Participants were told they represented a company and responded to measures of their preference for the particular contract term at stake. The results showed a consistent bias in favor of the status quo default term; labeling a given term the default significantly strengthened participants' preference for that term. These results are in accord with an extensive experimental literature on the impact on preferences of defaults, the status quo, and reference points more generally (e.g., KAHNEMAN, KNETSCH, AND THALER [1990] It is possible that contract default rules, whose relevance is contingent upon parties' agreement to contract, differ from other default states. Parties therefore might not perceive contingent contractual defaults as relevant reference points (KOROBKIN [1998] ; SCHWAB [1988] ). Ironically, however, the SOS "default contract" applied inevitably whenever proposed and whenever Respondents rejected a non-default proposal, bearing greater resemblance to a legal right than to a contractual default. Thus, the contingency of typical contractual defaults cannot account for the No Bias Finding.
Other aspects of the SOS experimental design, on the other hand, may explain the No Bias Finding. Specifically, the SOS participants chose among monetary gambles under risk (with no uncertainty), with the defaults comprising explicit risky gambles as well and providing no fixed reference points. Participants also faced only expected total gains. And, finally, the gambles were color-coded "contracts," devoid of the very institutional and legal context that define a real-world contract, remedy, or default rule.
These characteristics largely reflect a laudable adherence to experimental economics conventions, including the provision of monetary incentives for performance; the measurement of behavior rather than verbal responses; and the abstract description of experimental settings (CAMERER AND TALLEY [2005] ). The same design characteristics, however, also generated a context in which the very phenomenon SOS sought to test was unlikely to manifest itself: Neither endowment 3 Additional related phenomena include omission bias, regret and decision avoidance, inertia and more. 4 There is even specific anecdotal evidence of parties' reluctance to contract around legal defaults that appears largely inexplicable from a rational choice perspective. DONOHUE III [1991] noted that litigants never contract around the legal rule concerning the allocation of litigation costs, even where beneficial. FARNSWORTH [1999] examined a random set of 20 nuisance cases after judgment, finding no bargaining; the parties' lawyers also did not believe there would have been bargaining if the results were reversed. nor loss aversion typically occur for money (KAHENMAN, KNETSCH, AND THALER [1990] ); loss aversion also requires uncertainty about the benefits of the tradeoff between alternative states (NOVEMSKY AND KAHNEMAN [2005] ); 5 those reference points that generate loss aversion or a status quo bias, moreover, are typically certain (or appear so) rather than comprising explicit monetary gambles; and, finally, loss aversion would be unlikely to appear in choices among potential gains. An adoption of the default contract as a reference point -and the resulting perception of a potential loss on the part of participants -still might have been achieved in a richer, more realistic, institutional or legal context, resembling that of KOROBKIN [1998] , but such a context was intentionally avoided. Given the totality of the SOS experimental design, therefore, results showing the default contract to impact participants' choices would have been dramatic indeed. The present No Bias Finding, on the other hand, accords with the findings of the broader behavioral literature and the rational choice prediction alike.
The methodological conventions of experimental economics can contribute to legal analysis. When studying repetitive behavior in markets, for instance, the use of multiple trials and the provision of monetary performance incentives will often be appropriate.
6 When studying legal behavior, however, one must take care not to abstract from those aspects of the legal context that shape and define this behavior in the real world (see RACHLINSKI [2000] ). Such a careful approach would not limit ELE, but rather make it a more valid, versatile, and effective tool for legal analysis.
